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In Java, Indonesia, during March 2007–March 2008, 
96 farms with scavenging ducks that were not vaccinated 
against highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (HPAI) were mon-
itored bimonthly. Bird-level (prevalence among individual 
birds) H5 seroprevalence was 2.6% for ducks and 0.5% for 
chickens in contact with ducks. At least 1 seropositive bird 
was detected during 19.5% and 2.0% of duck- and chicken-
ﬂ  ock visits, respectively. Duck ﬂ  ocks were 12.4× more likely 
than chicken ﬂ  ocks to have seropositive birds. During 21.4% 
of farm visits, ≥1 sampled duck was H5 seropositive when 
all sampled in-contact chickens were seronegative. Sub-
type H5 virus was detected during 2.5% of duck-ﬂ  ock visits 
and 1.5% of chicken-ﬂ  ock visits. When deaths from HPAI 
infection occurred, H5 virus shedding occurred in apparent-
ly healthy birds on 68.8% of farms. Of 180 poultry deaths 
investigated, 43.9% were attributed to H5 virus. These lon-
gitudinal study results indicate that ducks are a source of 
infection for chickens and, potentially, for humans.  
S
ince 1997, when highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza 
(HPAI) subtype H5N1 outbreaks occurred in poultry 
in Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China (1–2), the virus 
has caused epidemics in Asia, Europe, and Africa (3). In 
Indonesia, the ﬁ  rst HPAI (H5N1) virus infections in poul-
try were ofﬁ  cially announced in early 2004 (4); human 
cases have been reported since mid-2005 (5). Although ex-
tensive HPAI control efforts helped reduce the frequency 
of outbreaks in poultry (6), by 2009, subtype H5N1 virus 
had been detected in 31 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces (7). 
In 2009, Indonesia had the highest incidence worldwide of 
human infections and deaths (8).
Waterfowl are the natural reservoir of avian inﬂ  uenza 
viruses (9), and experimental research indicates that ducks 
may play a role in the maintenance of HPAI (H5N1) vi-
ruses. Infected ducks may exhibit no clinical signs yet can 
excrete high concentrations of virus that are pathogenic 
to other poultry species (10–13). Possible risk factors for 
HPAI spread in Indonesia include duck movements, con-
tacts between ducks and other poultry and animal species, 
poor poultry husbandry, inadequate handling of sick and 
dead ducks by ﬂ  ock owners, and poor awareness of control 
strategies among poultry farmers (14). However, no ana-
lytical study assessing risk factors for HPAI infection has 
been conducted in Indonesia.
In 2005, Indonesia’s duck population was ≈34.3 mil-
lion, of which 40% were on the island of Java, mainly on 
smallholder farms, i.e., backyard and small commercial 
farms (14). As in many other Asian countries, domestic 
ducks on smallholder farms in Indonesia are allowed to 
scavenge freely during the day around houses, in the villag-
es, or in rice paddies; duck owners supply little or no feed 
(15). To assess the hypothesis that ducks contribute to the 
maintenance and transmission of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
viruses, we conducted a longitudinal investigation describ-
ing temporal patterns of antibodies against HPAI (H5) and 
virus prevalence in unvaccinated scavenging ducks and 
chickens that have contact with these ducks (in-contact 
chickens) in Java, Indonesia.
Materials and Methods
Study Design
Ducks and in-contact chickens on 96 smallholder duck 
farms in 4 districts of Central Java were monitored once ev-
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ery 2 months over 13 months. Four districts were selected 
(Sleman, Magelang, Bantul, and Kulon Progo) because of 
their high abundance of duck farms and proximity to the 
Disease Investigation Center (DIC) in Wates, where ﬁ  eld 
investigators were based and diagnostic work was con-
ducted (Figure 1). Sample size calculations were based on 
DIC surveillance data collected in Central Java in 2006; 
13 (4.7%) of 278 cloacal swabs from ducks were positive 
for H5 viral RNA on real-time reverse transcription–PCR 
(RT-PCR). On the basis of an expected true bird-level virus 
prevalence of 5%, a precision of the estimate of ±1.5 % and 
a 95% conﬁ  dence interval (CI), a total of 811 ducks had to 
be sampled (16). We enrolled 96 duck farms in the study 
and sampled a total of 960 ducks (10 ducks per farm) and 
480 in-contact chickens (5 chickens per farm) during each 
of 7 visits over 13 months (initial visit plus 6 bimonthly 
visits).
We used a multistage sampling strategy with stratiﬁ  -
cation by district and a 3-level sampling process that in-
volved villages, duck farms, and birds. A sampling frame 
was prepared by agriculture extension ofﬁ  cers who listed 
all villages in the selected districts, including the total num-
ber of duck farms within each village. We selected 4 vil-
lages within each district using probability proportional to 
size sampling. Field veterinarians then prepared a second 
sampling frame containing the names of all duck farmers 
within the 16 villages selected and the number of ducks 
kept by each farmer. From this sampling frame, 6 duck 
farms per village were selected by using simple random 
sampling. Farms with <10 ducks were excluded (we want-
ed to sample 10 ducks per farm) as were farms with >700 
ducks (which we considered to be large commercial farms). 
Random numbers for village and duck farm selection pro-
cedures were produced in STATA version 10.0 (StataCorp, 
College Station, TX, USA).
Data Collection and Diagnostic Tests
Four veterinarians from the DIC were trained in the use 
of data collection tools and interviewing techniques. Field 
visits were conducted once every 2 months from March 
2007 through March 2008; duck owners were interviewed 
and swab and blood samples from birds were obtained dur-
ing each visit. On the ﬁ  rst visit, birds were selected for the 
study. The duck owner enclosed all ducks in a pen and se-
lected the ﬁ  rst 10 ducks that could be caught. If available, 
5 chickens kept on the same farm were also selected in the 
same manner. Wing tags or leg bands were attached to each 
selected duck and chicken. Blood samples were collected 
from the wing vein of each bird, and an oropharyngeal 
swab and a cloacal swab were collected from each bird and 
placed into a single tube containing virus transport media 
(Universal Viral Transport 3mL; Becton Dickinson, Frank-
lin Lakes, NJ, USA). Duck owners conﬁ  rmed that none 
of the ducks and chickens sampled had been vaccinated 
against HPAI before the study and that none were vacci-
nated during the study.
Serum samples were tested for antibodies to avian 
inﬂ  uenza (H5) by using the hemagglutination inhibition 
(HI) test according to methods recommended by the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (17). Antigen and 
control antiserum were supplied from Pusat Vetenerinaria 
Farma (Surabaya, Indonesia). The antigen was derived 
from an HPAI (H5N1) chicken isolate obtained in 2004 in 
Indonesia (A/chicken/Pare/East Java/2004). This antigen is 
commonly used for HI tests to detect antibodies to avian 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) at all veterinary diagnostic laboratories 
in Indonesia. A titer >24 against 4 hemagglutinating units 
of antigen was considered positive (17). In accordance with 
the Australian Animal Health Laboratory protocol (18–19), 
RT-PCR was used to test the combined oropharyngeal and 
cloacal swabs of individual birds in pools of 5 for subtype 
H5 virus RNA. Sequencing was conducted on the H5 RT-
PCR–positive samples to conﬁ  rm the HPAI multiple basic 
amino acid motif at the cleavage site of the hemagglutinin 
gene and to determine whether the neuraminidase gene of 
the isolate belonged to the N1 subtype.
Investigations of Bird Deaths
Duck farmers involved in the study were asked to 
immediately report sickness or deaths of birds to the 
DIC. Compensation was paid to duck farmers to encour-
age reporting. Upon notiﬁ  cation, veterinarians conducted 
an outbreak investigation at the reported farm by using a 
predesigned questionnaire. Clinical signs were recorded, 
and carcasses were collected for postmortem examination. 
Blood and swab samples from clinically normal birds from 
the same farm were obtained on the day of the investiga-
tion. Blood samples were tested for antibodies to avian 
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Figure 1. Districts in Central Java, Indonesia, where ducks and in-
contact chickens were monitored bimonthly for avian inﬂ  uenza (H5) 
during March 2007–March 2008. RESEARCH
inﬂ  uenza (H5) as already discussed; swab samples from 
carcasses (combining lung, heart, liver, spleen, pancreas, 
and intestinal tissues) and from live birds were processed 
by virus isolation in embryonated eggs. Two passages of 
virus isolation were conducted, and allantoic ﬂ  uid was test-
ed for H5 antigen of avian inﬂ  uenza by using the HI test. 
An HPAI outbreak was deﬁ  ned as >1 bird dying within a 
few days of each other from HPAI (i.e., positive by subtype 
H5 virus isolation or RT-PCR).
Data Analyses
For both ducks and in-contact chickens, bird-level se-
roprevalence (proportion of study birds with antibodies to 
avian inﬂ  uenza [H5]) and ﬂ  ock-level seroprevalence (in 
which at least 1 study bird had antibodies) were calculated 
for each of the 7 sampling periods and pooled across the 
entire study period. Virus prevalence was calculated only 
at ﬂ  ock level (proportion of ﬂ  ock visits in which at least 1 
pool of swab samples from the farm was positive for H5 
RNA) for the entire study period. We accounted for the 
multistage sampling strategy in the data analyses by using 
survey commands in STATA version 10.0 (StataCorp); 
districts were treated as strata; villages were speciﬁ  ed as 
primary, and farms as secondary, sampling units. For bi-
monthly bird-level prevalences, and for bird- and ﬂ  ock-
level prevalences over the entire study period, sampling 
weights were the inverse of the product of the proportion of 
villages in the district that were sampled and the proportion 
of duck farms in the village that were sampled (20). The 
ﬁ  nite population correction factor for primary sampling 
units was the total number of villages in the district. Finite 
population correction accounted for reduction in variance 
associated with sampling without replacement (21). For 
bird-level seroprevalence calculations over the entire study 
period, we accounted for repeated measurements within the 
same birds by specifying the individual bird as the third 
level of sampling and incorporating the number of duck 
farms per village as the ﬁ  nite population correction factor 
for secondary sampling units. For the bimonthly ﬂ  ock-lev-
el seroprevalence, only primary sampling units with their 
ﬁ  nite population correction factor were speciﬁ  ed in the 
analyses. Sampling weights for bimonthly ﬂ  ock-level sero-
prevalence were the inverse of the proportion of villages in 
the sampled district.
We used logistic regression models accounting for 3 
levels of clustering (birds within farms within villages) to 
compare the odds of birds having titers positive for avian 
inﬂ  uenza (H5) between ducks and in-contact chickens. For 
ﬂ   ock-level comparisons, logistic regression models ac-
counting for 2 levels of clustering (farms within villages) 
were used to compare the odds of ﬂ  ocks having at least 1 
bird with antibodies to avian inﬂ  uenza (H5) between duck 
and in-contact chicken ﬂ  ocks, and for duck ﬂ  ocks between 
sampling months. Logistic regression accounting for 2 
levels of clustering was also used to evaluate whether the 
odds of duck (or chicken) ﬂ  ocks being seropositive were 
independent of the results of the other species at the same 
farm and sampling. All logistic regression models also ac-
counted for sampling weights and incorporated ﬁ  nite popu-
lation correction. Adjusted Wald tests were used to assess 
the overall effect of sampling month. After ﬁ  tting the lo-
gistic regression models taking the survey sampling de-
sign into account, we applied the F-adjusted mean residual 
goodness-of-ﬁ  t test (22).
Results
From March 2007 through March 2008, a total of 
8,993 serum and swab samples were collected from 6,705 
clinically healthy ducks and 2,288 chickens during 670 
farm visits (at 2 farm visits, all birds had been sold). Dur-
ing ≈80% of farm visits, chickens were present. Flock sizes 
for ducks and chickens averaged 53.7 and 8.5, respective-
ly. Of all combined oropharyngeal and cloacal swab sets 
from individual birds, 8,900 were analyzed in pools of 5 
by RT-PCR, and all serum samples were tested for anti-
bodies to subtype H5 virus. In addition, during outbreak 
investigations, 174 sets of swabs from dead birds and 136 
from apparently healthy live birds were collected from the 
outbreak farms.
Prevalence of Antibodies to Avian Inﬂ  uenza (H5) 
Bird-level seroprevalences of subtype H5 antibody ti-
ters >24 in clinically healthy birds for all bird samplings 
pooled over the entire study period were 2.6% (95% CI 
1.8–3.5) for ducks and 0.5% (95% CI 0.0–0.9) for in-con-
tact chickens. The odds of ducks being positive for avian 
inﬂ  uenza (H5) were 5.5× (95% CI 2.1–14.4) higher than for 
in-contact chickens. Flock-level seroprevalence of antibod-
ies to avian inﬂ  uenza (H5) was 19.5% (95% CI 14.3–24.6) 
for ducks and 2.0% (95% CI 0.1–3.9) for in-contact chick-
ens. The odds of duck ﬂ  ocks being seropositive were 12.4× 
(95% CI 3.9–40.1) higher than those for chicken ﬂ  ocks.
Figure 2 shows the H5 bird- and ﬂ  ock-level  sero-
prevalences for ducks and in-contact chickens from the 
beginning of March 2007 through the end of March 2008. 
Duck ﬂ  ock–level prevalence varied over time from 5.9% 
to 24.7%. The odds of a duck ﬂ  ock being seropositive dif-
fered signiﬁ  cantly by month (p = 0.05); odds were higher 
in July 2007 (odds ratio [OR] = 3.1; 95% CI 1.1–9.0), Sep-
tember 2007 (OR = 2.9; 95% CI 1.4–6.3), November 2007 
(OR = 3.7; 95% CI 1.7–8.1) 2007, January 2008 (OR = 3.9; 
95% CI 1.5–10.0), and March 2008 (OR = 5.3; 95% CI 
1.9–14.7), relative to May 2007. Chicken ﬂ  ock-level sero-
prevalences remained <6.2% throughout the study.
At 21.4% of 501 farm visits, >1 study duck was se-
ropositive for inﬂ  uenza (H5) when during the same farm 
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visits, all in-contact study chickens on these farms were se-
ronegative (Table). Conversely, at only 1.4% of farm visits 
was >1 study chicken seropositive for avian inﬂ  uenza (H5), 
while all study ducks on the farm were seronegative. At 
ﬂ  ock level, seropositivity of ducks was not associated with 
seropositivity of chickens on the same farm (OR = 3.9, 
95% CI 0.4–43.0). The goodness-of-ﬁ  t statistics calculated 
after ﬁ  tting the survey design–adjusted logistic regression 
models provided no evidence of lack of ﬁ  t of any of the 
models (p>0.05).
HPAI (H5) Virus Prevalence in Clinically Healthy Birds
Birds on 25 (26%) of the 96 monitored farms tested 
positive for avian inﬂ  uenza (H5) virus RNA; on 20 farms, 
birds tested positive on 1 sampling occasion and, on 5 farms, 
on 2 different sampling occasions. On these 25 farms, 30 
ﬂ  ocks (22 duck and 8 chicken ﬂ  ocks) tested positive for 
subtype H5 virus RNA. On 3 farms, both duck and chick-
en ﬂ  ocks tested positive for subtype H5 virus RNA at the 
same visit (6 ﬂ  ocks); otherwise, only 1 ﬂ  ock (either ducks 
or chickens) was positive for subtype H5 virus RNA at any 
1 visit (19 duck and 5 chicken ﬂ  ocks). The ﬂ  ock prevalence 
of subtype H5 virus RNA (proportion of ﬂ  ock-visits dur-
ing which at least 1 study bird was positive) in clinically 
healthy birds for all ﬂ  ock samplings pooled over the en-
tire study period was 2.5% (95% CI 0.9–4.1) for ducks and 
1.5% (95% CI 0.4–2.7) for chickens.
HPAI Outbreaks
Of 96 the study farms, 34 (35%) across all 4 districts 
had HPAI outbreaks during the study period (Figure 3). 
One farm had 3 outbreaks and 2 farms had 2 outbreaks 
in different months; each of the remaining 31 farms had 
1 outbreak. The numbers of outbreaks increased substan-
tially from 1 each in May and June 2007 to 7 each in July 
and September 2007.
On 16 of the 34 farms that experienced HPAI out-
breaks, combined swab samples were collected from 136 
clinically normal birds (109 ducks, 27 chickens) at the 
same time as samples from dead birds on the same farm. 
For 11 (69%) of 16 outbreak farms, HPAI (H5) virus was 
isolated from 37 (27%) of 136 clinically normal birds (28 
ducks, 9 chickens).
Carcasses of 180 marked and unmarked birds (59 
ducks, 121 chickens) were obtained; HPAI (H5N1) virus 
was isolated from 65 (10 ducks, 55 chickens). Another 
14 birds (3 ducks, 11 chickens) had most likely died from 
HPAI (H5) infection; we based this determination on 1) 
sudden death with or without clinical signs of HPAI (such 
as lethargy; swelling or discoloration of combs, wattles, 
and legs; nasal discharge; coughing and sneezing; diarrhea; 
and lack of coordination) and 2) isolation of HPAI (H5) vi-
rus from other dead birds within the ﬂ  ock at the same time. 
Therefore, a total of 79 (44%) of 180 birds most likely died 
from HPAI infection.
Discussion
Scavenging duck farming has been proposed as an 
important contributor to HPAI in poultry ﬂ  ocks in South-
east Asia, predominantly on the basis of ﬁ  ndings obtained 
through spatial analyses of national surveillance data of 
HPAI outbreaks (23–25). However, no ﬁ  eld studies have 
investigated infection patterns over time in duck farming 
systems. Results of the current study indicate that scaveng-
ing ducks are a source of infection for other poultry and, 
possibly, for humans.
One explanation for the higher seroprevalence in ducks 
than in chickens is that HPAI (H5N1) virus circulated more 
successfully among ducks than among in-contact chickens; 
hence, ducks were more likely to harbor and transmit the vi-
rus. This could because of a higher risk for death among in-
fected chickens, resulting in fewer surviving chickens with 
H5 antibodies, or to differences in scavenging behavior 
between ducks and chickens. Virulence of HPAI (H5N1) 
virus for ducks varies from inconsequential to highly lethal 
(10,26), and some of the 2003–04 Asian-lineage subtype 
H5N1 viruses can be shed by domestic ducks for up to 17 
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Figure 2. Bird- and ﬂ  ock-level seroprevalences of avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5) in ducks and in-contact chickens monitored for infection, Central 
Java, Indonesia, March 2007–March 2008. Error bars indicate 
point-wise 95% conﬁ  dence intervals. Flock-level seroprevalences 
are proportions of ﬂ  ocks where at least 1 bird had an antibody titer 
>24 to H5 virus. Estimates are adjusted for the survey structure.
Table. Antibodies to avian influenza (H5) in ducks and in-contact 
chickens monitored on the same farms during 501 farm visits, 
Central Java, Indonesia, March 2007–March 2008 
H5 serologic status 
of ducks* 
H5 serologic status of 
in-contact chickens† 
No. (%) farm 
visits  
Positive Positive  3 (0.6) 
Positive Negative 107 (21.4) 
Negative Positive 7 (1.4) 
Negative Negative 384 (76.6) 
*Based on results from 10 ducks at each farm visit. 
†Based on results from 5 in-contact chickens at each farm visit. RESEARCH
days postinfection (11,12). When viruses harbored by ducks 
are transmitted to gallinaceous species, such as chickens, 
severe clinical signs and high death rates can occur (10). 
However, for high-incidence HPAI outbreaks in chickens, 
virus excretion from infected ducks must be combined with 
an efﬁ  cient reproductive number (R0) to produce secondary 
cases in a susceptible chicken population. R0 is inﬂ  uenced 
by the infectiousness of the agent causing the disease, the 
probability of transmission (determined by factors such as 
housing, mixing, and feeding practices), and the level of 
population immunity. During the 2004 HPAI (H5N1) epi-
demic in Thailand, R0 estimates were lower for backyard 
chickens than for broilers and layers (27). Birds of the lat-
ter 2 groups are typically housed together; but backyard 
chickens usually have less contact with each other. On our 
study farms, ducks usually grazed together, behavior con-
ducive to virus circulation between ducks; individual in-
contact chickens scavenged more independently. Another 
possible explanation for the difference in seroprevalences 
between poultry species is that duck ﬂ  ocks were exposed 
to HPAI more frequently than were chickens. Duck ﬂ  ocks 
may graze in the same rice ﬁ  elds where other potentially 
infected domestic or wild birds may have grazed.
The higher ﬂ  ock-level seroprevalence in ducks than 
in chickens was probably not biased substantially on dif-
ferences in the numbers of birds sampled (10 ducks, 5 
chickens) at each farm visit. In ﬂ  ocks where no study birds 
were detected with avian inﬂ  uenza (H5) virus or antibody, 
the virus may have been in other ducks or chickens in the 
same ﬂ  ock, and therefore our ﬂ  ock-level prevalence esti-
mates underestimated the true ﬂ  ock prevalences. Because 
we sampled more ducks than chickens in each study ﬂ  ock, 
the risk for nondetection of infection was higher for chick-
ens. However, on the basis of sample size calculations for 
assessing freedom from disease, this bias is unlikely to ex-
plain the differences in ﬂ  ock prevalences of antibodies be-
tween ducks and chickens (28). For example, if the true se-
roprevalence was 3% in populations of 100 ducks and 100 
chickens, the probability of detecting at least 1 seropositive 
bird from 10 sampled ducks is 0.27 and, from 5 sampled 
chickens, 0.16. This equates to an OR of 1.9, which is sub-
stantially lower than the observed difference in ﬂ  ock-level 
prevalences in which the odds of duck ﬂ  ocks being sero-
positive were 12.4× higher than that of chicken ﬂ  ocks.
HI tests in which horse erythrocytes were used to de-
tect avian inﬂ  uenza antibodies in human serum were more 
sensitive than HI tests in which chicken erythrocytes were 
used (29). Because OIE does not recommend the horse 
erythrocyte method for HI tests on poultry serum samples, 
it is rarely used in poultry diagnostics, although some evi-
dence supports a higher sensitivity in these species (30). 
We compared HI tests based on horse and chicken eryth-
rocytes by using serum samples from 60 ducks experimen-
tally infected with 2 of the HPAI (H5N1) ﬁ  eld isolates 
from this study. These tests showed substantial agreement 
when results were categorized as positive (>24) or negative 
(κ = 0.74, 95% CI 0.57–0.90), although some samples test-
ed with horse erthrocytes had higher titers than when tested 
with chicken erythrocytes. Thus, seroprevalence estimates 
may have been similar to those reported here had the HI 
tests been conducted by using horse erthrocytes. We sug-
gest that OIE review this issue and, if warranted, modify 
the recommended diagnostic methods.
Virus shedding was reported in apparently clinically 
healthy birds on nearly 11/16 outbreak farms. Despite a 
high risk for death in chickens and some deaths in ducks, 
other birds carrying the virus appeared to be unaffected, 
which indicates that host-speciﬁ  c characteristics of sus-
ceptibility might have varied among birds. Alternatively, 
some of these virus-positive clinically normal birds could 
have been sampled early in infection and had not yet devel-
oped clinical signs. However, a small number of chickens 
in the longitudinal study had antibodies to avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5), providing further evidence that some chickens sur-
vive infection. These birds could have been infected with 
low pathogenicity avian inﬂ  uenza (LPAI) viruses. To our 
knowledge, the prevalence of LPAI in poultry in Indonesia 
is unknown. However, inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) viruses isolated 
from dead and live birds in our study were conﬁ  rmed to 
be highly pathogenic. Further molecular characterization of 
these isolates is under way (31).
The frequency of HPAI outbreaks varied throughout 
the study period. Outbreaks increased in July 2007 (the be-
ginning of the dry season), coinciding with an increased 
proportion of ﬂ  ocks with seropositive ducks. This increase 
suggests that HPAI (H5) virus was circulating among more 
duck ﬂ  ocks during this time and may be related to the prac-
tice of herding free-ranging ducks to scavenge on paddy 
ﬁ  elds postharvest as described for Thailand and Vietnam 
(24,25). Intermingling of ducks on paddy ﬁ  elds may al-
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Figure 3. Number of highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza  (HPAI) 
(H5N1) outbreaks, by month, in 96 randomly selected smallholder 
duck farms, Central Java, Indonesia, March 2007–March 2008.Scavenging Ducks and HPAI, Indonesia
low extensive opportunities for virus release and exposure 
and contact with wild birds that also feed on leftover rice 
(25). However, the relationship between rice farming and 
HPAI outbreaks in Indonesia is likely to vary from those in 
Thailand and Vietnam because of different climatic condi-
tions and rice farming calendars. Rice farming in Central 
Java is less seasonal, and rice paddies are smaller, often 
not separated by wide waterways, unlike in the Mekong 
Delta of Vietnam. Other factors, such as the long distance 
movement of duck ﬂ  ocks, may inﬂ  uence outbreak patterns 
in Indonesia. Further studies are needed on the manage-
ment and movement of duck ﬂ  ocks, HPAI transmission 
pathways between different poultry species, and the asso-
ciation between rice harvest activities and increased HPAI 
outbreaks. 
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